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Information and communication technologies (ICTs) produce public goods for
societies. Through ICTs people can be more politically active, construct their social
identities, strengthen bonds with significant others, and more. However, businesses
provide access to the Internet, produce and sell hardware and software, while
maintaining platforms that are used for the generation of these public goods. There is
a contradiction inherent in this dynamic as the continued provision of these public
goods is contingent upon private entities deeming them profitable. Within the United
States, federal policies have not adequately addressed this contradiction. In this paper,
I argue that a change in the way ICTs are conceptualized is needed in order to increase
interest in protecting the public goods produced by ICTs. To this end, I describe a
model in which interconnected ICTs work in layers to produce a single digital
environment. People must have access to each layer in this environment in order to
benefit from the goods produced. In this environment, there is room for both market
spaces that support commerce and non-market spaces that support public goods. I
argue that this model can aid citizens and advocacy groups in framing and justifying
the need for nurturing non-market spaces.
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Introduction
Information and communication technologies (ICTs) are used to produce both private
goods for the market and public goods for society. On the one hand, the production,
buying, and selling of ICTs has spurred economic growth in industrialized countries.
On the other hand, ICTs produce public goods for societies. People can be more
politically active, can develop their identities, collaborate in new ways, and they can
strengthen bonds with friends and family. In Western societies, having access to the
Internet and its associated technologies is becoming a prerequisite for being an active
citizen.
However, there are inherent tensions between the non-market activities afforded by
ICTs and the market oriented entities that sustain them. Businesses provide access to
the Internet, produce hardware and software, and maintain the platforms that are used
for social interaction. Thus, the production and maintenance of the public benefits
provided by ICTs are contingent upon the continued profitability of these businesses.
Government policies can address these tensions by protecting and nurturing these
spaces. Services such as law enforcement, fire protection and safety, and the provision
of utilities such as electricity and sanitation, are considered too important to the
welfare of society to have the whims of the free market sustain them. These services
and utilities are directly administered by government agencies or are tightly regulated
through government policy. I suggest that similar distinctions should be made
between private and public goods supported by ICTs and that that the public goods
should be regulated accordingly.
Unfortunately, American federal policy towards ICTs has narrowly focused on
expanding markets for large telecommunications companies. I argue that a change in
the way we view ICTs is needed in order to increase citizen interest in protecting the
public goods produced by these systems. To this end, I describe a model in which
interconnected ICTs work in layers to produce a single digital environment. People
must have access to each layer in this environment in order to benefit from the goods
produced. Within this new framework, there is room within the digital environment
for both market spaces that support commerce and non-market spaces that support
public goods. This framework can aid policy-makers and advocacy groups in
justifying the need for nurturing non-market spaces.

United States federal policies governing information and communication
technologies
Baker and de Sa [1] argue that “the modern trajectory of [American] federal
communications policy has been directed toward creating and protecting competitive
communications services markets.” In addition to Baker and de Sa’s claim, I add that
the beneficiaries of these policies have primarily been large, incumbent companies. I
focus on two of the more widely discussed policies — one aimed at infrastructure and
one aimed at content — that illustrate this general trend.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996
The stated goal of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was to “let anyone enter any
communications business — to let any communications business compete in any
market against any other” (U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 2015). The act
mandated that established companies with already built communication lines must
lease their networks to newer companies and companies must interconnect with each
other. In this way, a newer company could use the communication lines already put in
place by established companies and have access to the users on other companies’
networks. Although the act was meant to increase competition among service
providers, the years that followed saw a consolidation of the market (Howard, 1998;
Fu, 2010; McChesney, 2013). Thus, “nearly 20 percent of U.S. households have
access to no more than a single broadband provider ... all but four percent of
remaining households has, at most, two choices for wired broadband access” [2].
The act also focused on “increasing access to evolving services for consumers living
in rural and insular areas, and for consumers with low-incomes” (U.S. Federal
Communications Commission, 2016). Several programs falling under the title of
“universal service programs,” funded through taxes levied on telecommunications
companies, were initiated to provide access to rural and low income Americans [3].
These programs opened up new markets by subsidizing the building of
communication lines for hard to reach populations. The largest program attempting to
achieve universal service is the Connect America fund. This fund provides over
US$500 million annually in subsidies to telecommunications company Century Link
to bring 10mbps broadband service to rural areas. Similarly, AT&T was awarded over
US$525 million annually for the same purpose. The benefit to consumers is that they
will have access to faster Internet service. However, the greatest beneficiary of the
Connect America Fund and the Telecommunications Act are large
telecommunications companies like Century Link and AT&T whose access to new
customers is subsidized.

Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) protects intellectual property, and
does so in two ways. First, the act prohibits direct breaches of copyright. This includes
the unauthorized duplication or sharing of music, video, and software. Second, the act
prohibits tools (computer software) that allow consumers to circumvent copyright
protections encoded into digital goods (DRM).
A key component of the DMCA is the ‘safe harbor’ provision. Safe harbor means that
Internet service providers (ISPs) will not be held liable for infringing material if they
disable access to the material upon request from the copyright holder. Safe harbor has
also been extended to content platforms like YouTube and Google. A copyright
holder can send letters (takedown requests) to platforms, claiming that videos hosted
on their Web site are infringements on their copyright. The platform can avoid
liability by removing the material on the good faith belief that the content is
infringing. Safe harbor protects market activities by protecting the buying and selling
of intellectual property.
Scholars have argued that the DMCA stifles cultural production and innovation
(Lessig, 2008; Litman, 2001; Chused, 2014). The way in which the DMCA is
executed makes it easier for large entities to ‘bully’ small companies or individuals
through the use of takedown requests. In many cases, the content thought to be
infringing copyright is covered under fair use policies or has been modified and
remixed to the point in which it is a new cultural product. In theory, the producer of
the removed content can provide to the ISP or the content platform a counter
notification indicating that the material is not infringing. In practice, individuals or
even small businesses do not have the resources to invest in such measures. The rise
of automated takedown requests has given even more leverage to entities that have the
resources to implement this technology. The number of takedown requests
skyrocketed from 100 in 2009 to 345 million in 2014 (Karaganis and Urban, 2015).
The DMCA is a market-friendly policy. It protects copyright holders and the
companies who make the content available to the public. However, many forms of
user-generated content are less protected and in most cases their production is
threatened. People use the Internet for self-expression. Even if they are using
copyrighted content, it is not for the purpose of commerce [4]. There is a vibrant
remix or mashup culture online of tweets, videos, text, and other memes (Lessig,
2008; Shifman, 2013). This culture generates new symbolic products from older
copyrighted ones and is being hampered by clumsy digital copyright rules as well.

The FCC orders of 2010 and 2015: An example of viewing technology through a
different lens
The two policies discussed above illustrate the market-centered approach that
dominates American telecommunications policy. However, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) Order of 2015 represents a deviation from this
trend. It is an example of a federal policy that recognizes the public benefits afforded
by ICTs and does not attempt to sustain these benefits with market-based solutions.
Crucially, the justification for the passage of the order rested on a reclassification of
the Internet from an information service to a public utility.
Advocacy groups had argued for some time that the principle of ‘network neutrality’
was in danger. Network neutrality is the principle that ISPs cannot discriminate in
favor of a given content, site or platform by charging different rates for access to those
platforms or changing the traffic speeds between these platforms and the subscribers
on their networks (Wu, 2003). The pipes transporting data packets should be ‘neutral’
and handle all data on a first come, first served basis. If service providers like Verizon
or AT&T could discriminate, they have a strong incentive to favor their own content,
or a favored third party. Individuals or small companies producing content would be
at a disadvantage as they could not pay any extra fees which ISPs may charge for a
‘fast lane’ service to transmit data to subscribers. A relaxation of network neutrality
boosts market activities. New streams of revenue are possible as companies sell
different speeds and content packages. Conversely, a tightening of network neutrality
rules supports non-market activities by protecting individuals and organizations who
wish to produce content or services that do not generate a profit.
In 2010, the FCC attempted to make net neutrality law by issuing their Open Internet
Order of 2010. This was the first attempt by the FCC to apply network neutrality rules
to service providers [5]. The proposed order would have prevented blocking (the
prevention of data transmission for a given application or service) and throttling (the
slowing down of data speeds). In extreme circumstances, service providers could
manipulate speeds however these actions would have to be transparent to consumers.
This first attempt at policy was deemed unconstitutional because the Internet had been
designated by the FCC as an ‘information service,’ and thus could not be regulated in
this manner.
In March of 2015, the FCC voted to reclassify broadband Internet as a public utility.
This reclassification allows the FCC to legally enforce network neutrality rules.
Mirroring the 2010 order, the FCC prohibits the blocking and throttling of data under
normal circumstances. The 2015 order also prohibits paid prioritization or the selling

of ‘fast lanes.’ In this way, network neutrality rules were strengthened. As Starr
(2016) writes, “the FCC has proposed a standard that achieves these goals without
infringing upon innovative practices, or end user access to the open internet” [6].
The FCC Order of 2015 is significant because it illustrates the importance of a
conceptual change. Thinking of broadband as an information service had made it
easier to rationalize the provision of this service via the free market. However, by
seeing it as a public utility, mechanisms were put in place to ensure that the public can
have these services. To be sure, customers are still paying a business to provide them
with this public utility, which is problematic, as I will discuss below. However, the
point I am making is that a conceptual change preceded a change in policy.

The tensions between market and non-market spaces
There are a number of tensions between the desires of private enterprise and the
desires of the public with respect to ICTs. These tensions are inherent in the provision
of public goods by private entities. In most instances, privately held businesses
happily provide the public benefits that are afforded by ICTs. However, the
underlying imperative to produce a profit means that this public benefit is always
contingent upon its ability to aid in generating revenue. This is evident in the
following examples.
Free speech
When free speech and risk of losing market share collide in market spaces, free
speech loses. Several instances illustrate this point. Over the past several years,
Google has made moves to restrict pornography. It has banned pornography from
appearing in its online ads, from being shown publicly on its blogger site, and banned
adult content from its Google Glass network. Facebook launched what it calls an
‘Initiative for civil courage online’ [7]. The initiative “aims to remove hate speech
from the site by finding and then removing comments that promote xenophobia”
(Griffin, 2016). Pornography and racism may be distasteful, but within an American
context it is vital that the speech of others be protected. Indeed, it is only unpopular
speech that needs to be protected. As private businesses, Google and Facebook have
no incentive to sully their reputations by taking principled stands and protecting
unpopular speech.
Coding for profit making behaviors

As companies become more adept at monetizing behavior, ICTs will be designed and
coded with those behaviors in mind. “Tethered” devices — hardware that is connected
to the Internet, but only modifiable by their manufacturers — severely limit the
freedom users have to control their experience (Zittrain, 2008). From a market
standpoint, companies have little incentive for allowing someone to tweak and modify
their devices. Moreover, giving consumers flexibility with their devices increases the
chances of copyright infringement. Apple has a closed system and iPhone owners who
used a third party to repair their phones found that their devices had been disabled
(Brignall, 2016).
Content providers are constantly experimenting with new ways of channeling
consumer behavior in more profitable ways. YouTube has unveiled a new service
called YouTube Red. This service offers an enhanced, advertisement-free video
service. YouTube faces the same reality as other platforms, including Twitter, who
rely on ad-based business models that struggle to become profitable. Despite having
more than one billion users per month, as of February 2015, YouTube was not turning
a profit (Winkler, 2015). Even Netflix, a content provider that is profitable, continues
to tweak its services to extract as much revenue as possible. In the early days of the
service, a user could buy a subscription and loan that subscription to others. Netflix
has since recoded their services to protect against such sharing of services.
Subscribers must now pay for multiscreen options. Possibly the most well-known
example of content providers organizing human behavior are the algorithmically
constructed “filter bubbles” (Pariser, 2011) of personalized information users find
themselves in when using Google’s search engine.
Neglected populations
With regards to access, minority and low-income populations may be underserved
because companies have less incentive to reach them. ICTs, like most products that
require a heavy initial investment, are aimed at mass markets. At least in this respect,
federal policy has acknowledged this tension and initiated programs to address it.
While these programs recognize the shortcomings of a purely market oriented
approach, as noted above, these programs are about access and ultimately provide new
consumers for companies.
With regards to online content, there is still a danger that minority voices may not be
heard, or rather, minority voices that do not elicit enough ‘clicks’ will be deemed
unsuitable for online media outlets. The notion that the Internet can contribute to the
stifling of different opinions seems at odds with general understandings. The common
narrative is that the Internet has lowered barriers to entry and more people and groups
are able to get their voices heard than ever before. There is some truth to this as
evidenced by social movements such as #Occupy and #Blacklivesmatter. However,

Hindman (2009) has shown convincingly that in every aspect of online political
consumption a few individuals or entities dominate the marketplace of ideas. The top
200 newspaper outlets (e.g., New York Times, Washington Post)
command greater market share online (measured primarily in click shares) than they
do in their print versions. More worrying is the domination of the blogosphere by
elites, as Hindman writes:
Overwhelmingly, they are well-educated white male professionals.
Nearly all of the bloggers in our census were either educational
elites, business elites, technical elites, or traditional journalists. It
is therefore difficult to conclude that blogging has changed which
sorts of citizens have their voices heard in politics. [8]

In a pure market environment, the opinions of racial minorities, gays and lesbians,
women, and people from working class and poor backgrounds may be crowded out.
Media companies in the digital environment will clamor for clicks in the same way
that traditional media in the physical environment sought listeners and viewers. The
hard logic of the click may take precedence over the ethical obligation to include
diverse voices.

A new lens: The digital environment
The argument thus far is that American telecommunications policy takes a marketbased approach, and that these policy decisions endanger the public benefits produced
by the Internet and networked computing. Unfortunately, public interest in securing
these benefits appears to be lacking if mainstream news coverage is any indication.
For example, the debate over network neutrality has been arguably the most visible
telecommunications policy issue over the last decade. Yet, a 2014 report from the Pew
Internet and American Life project states:
An analysis of 2,820 news programs from January 1, 2014 through
May 12 across eight different network and cable news channels
found just 25 programs mentioned the term net neutrality. What’s
more, six of those programs, the most of any channel, were on Al
Jazeera America, a new channel that is not available in many
American households. On, CNN, the second-largest cable news
network, we found just a single program mentioned net neutrality
in the 658 programs on CNN studied since January. [9]

This lack of interest may be because of how ICTs are conceptualized and framed
within the public discourse. In this section I discuss a conceptual model of the space
created by the Internet and its associated technologies that may reframe the debate.
This model does not view ICTs as distinct pieces of technology or communication
media. Instead, this model conceptualizes ICTs as producing a single, distinct
environment. This environment is a lived space(s), possessing social forces distinct
from the physical environment. It is these social forces that give rise to the public
goods we cherish.
Seeing ICTs as producing lived spaces, as opposed to solely a mechanism for
communication, mirrors Castells (2000) distinction between the “space of flows” and
the “space of places.” The former are places and the people in them who have taken
advantage of ICTs to tap into global information flows. They are highly networked,
stateless, and global in outlook. The latter have access to these flows to a lesser extent,
are parochial in outlook, and value the traditions of their particular environment. As
mentioned above, the FCC reclassified broadband Internet from an information
service to a telecommunications service understood to be a public utility, thereby
allowing the agency to enforce network neutrality rules. Changes within academia
also parallel this reasoning. Scholars concerned with ICT usage and inequality have
moved from exploring access to the Internet to exploring the ways in which people
use the Internet. The former could be labeled “digital divide” studies and the latter
could be labeled “digital inequality” studies (Attewell, 2001; DiMaggio, et al., 2004).
This shift in academia acknowledges the more complex behaviors that are now
possible in the digital environment and the understanding that these behaviors matter
for life outcomes. For example, Donner’s (2015) “after access lens” for mobile
Internet usage, focuses on how mobile telephony “provide opportunities for
individuals and communities to reconfigure their relationship to information and space
in potentially powerful, productive ways” [10]. In the paragraphs below I describe a
model that also reflects this more complex understanding of the Internet.
A layered environment of interconnected ICTs
Computer scientists and engineers conceptualize the Internet and its associated
technologies as a ‘layered’ system. Like scholars such as van Schewick (2010) and
Zittrain (2008), I use this understanding to contextualize important implications that
move beyond technological aspects.
Table 1 shows a model of a layered digital environment, emphasizing the social
aspects of ICTs. Seven layers are presented, starting with the bottom layer of
infrastructure and ending with a top layer of human users. For each layer I give a
description and examples. A path of inputs can be followed from the bottom layer to
top layer. The infrastructure layer comprises the cables, satellites, and cell phone

towers that allow various pieces of hardware to connect to each other. An Internet
service provider, in the infrastructure layer, provides access to its broadband and WiFi connection to a device in the hardware layer. These pieces of hardware are then
used as platforms for the millions of software applications. Thus, Firefox is a Web
browser that allows users to use their hardware to find files (Web sites) on the World
Wide Web or Instagram makes it easier for users to share photos with each other. The
top two layers, content and human, rely the most on human manipulation instead of
code, and are the most theoretically rich for social scientists. Yet the principle of
layering still applies. Through the use of software, humans have the ability to produce
and consume content. This content becomes the input for the human layer, such that
meanings are generated through the interpretation of text, music, and images.

An environment with unique social forces
Scholars have pointed out the many changes in micro and macro level behaviors
afforded by the proliferation of ICTs. From a sociological perspective, these
affordances are social forces that, once an individual enters the digital environment,
enable and constrain human behavior. These social forces are, in effect, the public

benefits produced through the digital environment. There are many, and I list several
of the more prominent here.
First, the production of symbolic content has been democratized. People no longer
need bureaucracies and large companies to aid in the making and transportation of
things that have value in society. Through personal computers, people produce texts,
video, audio, ideas, and can share these with anyone. Second, time and space are
compressed. Digitized data moves through interconnected computer networks at
speeds that seem almost instantaneous. Distance is no longer a major barrier to
communication. Third, we are pseudonymous online. Baym (2015) argued that we
bring our gendered and cultural selves into the digital environment. While this is true,
this importing of identity is voluntary and at any rate there remains a level of
anonymity possible when navigating the digital environment. This aspect of the digital
environment gives users the freedom to develop one or several digital identities (Siles,
2012; Lingel and Golub, 2015).
Fourth, human made code determines the laws that must be followed. Unlike in the
physical world where people must understand and manipulate laws that are not of
their making, the characteristics of the digital environment are produced. The design
of a given social media platform (i.e., the code used to produce the platform) has a
direct influence on the type of social behaviors present on that platform (Lüders,
2008; Papacharissi, 2009). In the infrastructure layer, the decision on what protocols
are used for networking hardware has been the subject of much debate (see DeNardis,
2009). Code is also an enabler, and machines can be coded to foster the public goods
produced by ICTs. For example, after describing how social media companies
maneuver for user attention, van Dijck writes:
Algorithms undergirding all kinds of social acts are becoming
increasingly compatible and thus interchangeable ... Code could be
considered the new Esperanto of online sociality — a universal
currency that makes social, cultural, political, and economic
discourses interchangeable. [11]

A porous, but distinct environment
In the early days of studying the Internet, much was made of a ‘virtual world” — a
world that was foreign and distant from the physical world. This understanding has
fallen out of favor amongst scholars. Advances in technology make the move between
the physical and digital environments almost seamless and the distinctions between
them less glaring. It is well understood the ICTs have a societal impact on people,
even if they are not using these technologies (see Webster, 2014). However, in order
to directly experience the social forces produced in the digital environment and

manipulate the public benefits, a person must use that technology directly and enter
into that environment. Therefore, another way of describing the relationship between
the physical and the digital is that the boundaries separating the two are
semipermeable or “porous.” This perspective recognizes the almost seamless
connection between the physical and the digital, yet acknowledges that actions must
be taken to move between the two.
This framing of the digital environment may seem to have little import on the
understanding of ICTs, market spaces, and non-market spaces. However, I suggest
that acknowledging a distinct environment is fundamental to the argument. In the
simplest sense, without recognizing that people must do something in order to enter
into and experience these public benefits, one cannot conceptualize its distinctness
and the ways in which public policy and market forces can restrict entry.

Market and non-market spaces in the digital environment
The argument I have sketched so far is that ICTs create a single digital environment.
This environment is characterized by unique social forces not found in the physical
world. It is these unique social forces that give rise to the phenomena — the public
goods — we have come to expect and enjoy. In order to experience and take
advantage of these public goods, individuals must enter into this space.
We can imagine that within this environment are several sub-spaces where different
activities take place. These spaces can be delineated by some barrier to entry — for
example, a paywall for an online newspaper or the need to register for a social
networking site. They may be completely free of obvious demarcation lines, but no
less real. Online communities may place few obvious barriers to entry, yet someone
who goes to the Web site or uses the hashtag (if it is formed through social media)
will soon realize that normative patterns are present and are enforced, establishing a
symbolic line of demarcation between outside and inside. In this same manner, we can
imagine that within the digital environment there can be both market and non-market
spaces. Market spaces are oriented towards the exchange of goods and services
regulated by prices, profits, and losses. By contrast, non-market spaces are the
platforms, software, communities of people, and even small collections of
infrastructure that are managed without the desire to sell products. Ultimately, nonmarket spaces are needed to ensure non-market activities.

An argument can be made that making a distinction between market and non-market
— be it spaces or activities — is artificial. For example, Banks and Humphreys (2008)
argue for a change in the way scholars view the relationship between the producers of
content for non-market purposes and the businesses that use this content for profit.
They write:
The consequences of commercial enterprises coming to rely on
this form of [social] production to varying degrees is not
necessarily outright cooptation or appropriation, but the emergence
of new social network market institutions and processes, in which
the commercial entities are changing shape as they seek to harness
the productive activities of amateurs. [12]

Similarly, working from a feminist-Marxist perspective, Jarrett argues that “binaries
are fundamentally unhelpful in understanding the complexity of economically
significant but socially important labour such as ... digitally mediated social
interaction” [13].
Banks and Humphreys, as well as Jarrett, introduce a theoretically fruitful level of
complexity to human activities in the digital environment. However, the purpose of
the conceptual model presented here is to simplify to the point where individual
citizens and policy makers can envision ways of protecting public goods in the digital
environment. These ends call for a clear typology of spaces and activities, so that
groups and policy makers can identify and potentially produce policies based on those
categories. Aside from these practical reasons, I make a theoretical claim that
the space takes precedence over the activity. The space is the ultimate judge of
productive and unproductive, competitive or cooperative activity. Market spaces in
private hands produce, ultimately, market activities — even if these activities are
perceived as non-market by those undertaking them.
Table 2 gives examples of activities divided by market type and layer. I discuss three
of these layers — infrastructure, content, and human. I choose these three because
they illustrate different types of within-layer dynamics. The infrastructure layer is
heavily skewed towards the market, with little non-market activity. The content layer
has a healthy mixture of market and non-market spaces. The human layer appears to
be dominated by non-market activity, but in reality these are market spaces that have
monetized non-market activities.

The infrastructure layer is dominated by a market space where Internet subscriptions
are bought and sold. In most markets, consumers only have one or two choices for
gaining Internet access. Given the lack of choice and the fact that the infrastructure
layer is the most necessary layer, there is an urgent need for nurturing non-market
spaces in this layer. One option is for a local municipality to build a network for its
citizens. Access to the network is then provided at no cost or for a fee that is well
below that of commercial ISPs. In this way Internet infrastructure is run like a public
utility. The long-term feasibility of municipal broadband is still unclear as it has had
its share of failures (see Tapia and Ortiz, 2010) as well as successes in Chattanooga,
Tennessee (Wyatt, 2014) and Lafayette, Louisiana (Jervis, 2012).
The content layer is characterized by vibrant market and non-market activities and
spaces. This is in spite of the DMCA, which has given a disproportionate amount of
power to large companies that produce content. In the content layer, spaces that
support the buying and selling of video on services like Netflix and Hulu are
alongside spaces that sustain the sharing of content that have less stringent or no
copyright protections. The open access movement, an effort to offer academic
research without cost to scholars and the public, has grown over the past decade (see
Suber, 2012). The non-profit organization, Creative Commons, has established a set
of copyright licenses that allow owners of creative works to grant varying levels of

copyright permissions. This is a remedy to the restrictive ‘all rights reserved’
copyright attached to most creative works. Wikipedia has adopted an ‘AttributionShareAlike’ license. Content can be copied and shared from Wikipedia as long as it is
properly cited and any remixed content must also be licensed as AttributionShareAlike.
It is in the human layer where the bulk of scholarly work within the social sciences
has taken place. This is the layer that scholars credit for aiding numerous modern
social movements like the Arab Spring and the Occupy Movement. This is also the
layer where the various types of virtual communities reside. The increased level of
political participation is also best understood as occurring in the human layer. The
bulk of public goods that scholars explore and laypersons cherish are found in this
human layer. The irony here is that the layer that produces the most identifiably public
goods is also the layer most dependent upon private companies. Most of the social
movements, virtual community building, and political participation occur through forprofit entities like Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram who monetize user behaviors
(technically speaking, it is the manipulation of content made possible by proprietary
software giving commands to a piece of hardware).
Fuchs’ (2008) model of cooperation and competition parallels some of the ideas
presented here. By comparing the present model to Fuchs’ well-known work, I can
more clearly delineate the present model’s distinguishing characteristics. First,
Fuchs’s model is meant to explain the information society writ large. His levels climb
from individual actors to institutions to international communication ecologies, and its
scope spreads to all domains of life from the economy to culture to politics. By
contrast, the model I present here assumes that technologies produce a distinct
environment that can be considered separately (and thus, be more amenable to
regulation) from the institutions that have traditionally ordered the physical
environment — education, economy, etc. This distinction is important. If, for
example, one sees the buying and selling of hardware as not unlike the buying and
selling of automobiles, then there is little justification for applying a different logic to
the former. It is imperative that hardware be conceptualized as contributing to a
distinct space where we live, and on that basis requires special consideration.
Second, Fuchs’ theoretical perspective is Marxian. Fuchs’ assumption is that the
antagonism between cooperation (e.g., non-market) and competition (e.g., market)
activities needs to be resolved, with the competitive components of the information
society withering away. In writing about competition and cooperation in the economy,
Fuchs argues:
The future could either be a society totally controlled by politicaleconomic monopolies, which could very well result in a new

totalitarianism or fascism, or a cooperative society in which the
common production processes of the multitude become the
determining societal force to that self-determination, cooperative
ownership, and participatory democracy can flourish. [14]

The model I present does not assume that the profit seeking and competitive aspects
of society are inherently detrimental to the digital environment as a whole. The digital
environment model suggests that market and non-market activities can co-exist
provided the proper regulatory structure is in place.

Policy changes using the digital environment model
The purpose of this paper was to (1) show how federal policy has emphasized the
growth of market oriented spaces in the digital environment; (2) explain how this
growth has threatened the non-market activities cherished by many; and (3) present a
conceptual model that can galvanize efforts to nurture non-market spaces through
federal policy. In this section, I illustrate how citizens and advocacy groups can use
the digital environment model to justify changes in policy.
Discussions of policy do not need to assume a zero-sum game between market and
non-market activities in a given layer. In the same way that life in the physical
environment is not completely commodified (although neoliberal ideology pushes us
in that direction), so too with the digital environment. The digital environment is vast,
providing an array of experiences. And so, the subsidizing of non-market spaces by
government funding or changes in policy that orient our institutions to nurturing nonmarket spaces need not be interpreted as existential threats to business concerns.
One way of thinking about this is by applying the ‘long tail’ phenomenon to the
digital environment model. The long tail describes the many niche markets that extend
out from mainstream markets in a long tail (imagine a bell curve with one tail of the
distribution extending out to infinity). The hip-hop and country music market is
mainstream with millions of people buying these products. By contrast, the market for
Gregorian chants is niche, with only a relative few people interested. Arguably, the
most popular account of the long tail is that of Anderson (2008) who showed how
online retailers leveraged the affordances of new technologies to sell niche products
and compete with big box stores. Through the selling of niche products in the long tail
— including Gregorian chants — online retailers like Amazon and eBay were able to
compete with traditional big box stores. The long tail has clear implications for market

spaces and the market activities these spaces foster. But, if we consider the digital
environment as a distinct environment where we live, we can broaden the implications
of the long tail to niche non-market activities.
For example, consider an organization looking to develop an e-health software
application designed specifically for non-English speaking Hispanic males living in
racially segregated areas in the United States. The application would facilitate
communication with healthcare professionals. The rationale behind this application
would be that Hispanic males have poorer health outcomes than white males and this
is exacerbated by living in highly segregated areas containing limited healthcare
facilities. This application would take into account the specific values, beliefs, and
structural barriers of that group and as a consequence would be a niche product in the
‘long tail’ of e-health applications. This application should not be a commodity that is
produced and sold to individuals or health care agencies. Instead, it should be a public
good that is supported by government funding — a non-market space supporting
what should be the non-market activity of communicating with a healthcare
professional.

Table 3 lists examples of policies by layer. Recall that federal policy has traditionally
looked to market based solutions, and has focused primarily on access in the
infrastructure layer. I suggest that policies be aimed at non-profit organizations or
individuals pledging to make their products freely available. For three of these layers
— content, software, and infrastructure — funding could be in the form of research
grants or subsidies. This is a straightforward measure and it would help nurture nonmarket spaces that would ultimately support non-market activities. The hardware
layer presents a challenge because of the degree of capital investment required.
However, policies can continue to incentivize companies to make older versions of

their hardware available to underserved populations through tax breaks. More
creatively, funding can be provided for organizations that refurbish older pieces of
hardware for use by underserved populations.
Policies in the human layer are concerned with how we educate citizens about ICTs.
In the United States emphasis is placed on training citizens to be productive workers
in the information economy. Students are taught coding or computer networking with
the express purpose of leveraging these skills in the labor market. Given that we live
so much of our lives in the digital environment, citizens need to know ‘civic digital
literacy,’ along with the current market based emphasis on technology education.
Educational institutions can offer more courses and develop programs that focus on,
for example, the history of the Internet, its current regulatory structure, its benefits for
society, and so on. Civic digital literacy classes are, in effect, producing non-market
mental spaces that pave the way for future non-market activities.
Within the United States there are already such policies in place to a limited degree.
Research is already being funded, corporations already received tax deductions for
charitable giving, and there are numerous secondary and post-secondary institutions
that teach courses with aspects of civic digital literacy (although they are not called as
such). However, as I discussed above, public interest in nurturing non-market spaces
remains low. I believe this is because the conceptual foundations are not present to
justify this greater interest. My hope is that individuals and advocacy groups using the
digital environment model, or other similar models, can grow this interest.

Conclusion
One of the better arguments for nurturing non-market spaces alongside market spaces
can be found in MacKinnon (2012). MacKinnon argued that a “digital commons” can
be a counterweight to government and corporate power. MacKinnon’s premise is also
adopted here. Like MacKinnon, I believe that market and non-market spaces can coexist. Private enterprise has spurred tremendous innovation and growth in the number
of ICT users over the past several decades. The nurturing of non-market spaces within
various layers of the digital environment does not imply, then, a desire to repress
market spaces. Instead, what I am arguing is that the public benefits that society
receives from ICTs are not the ultimate purpose of businesses. These are simply
means to an end, and as a result are always contingent upon their economic viability.

We are several decades into the Internet revolution — when networked computing
became widely available. Since that time entering into and navigating the digital
environment has become essential for full participation in modern life. Such an
important space cannot be trusted wholly to the whims of the market. I have presented
in this paper a conceptual model that I hope can galvanize interest in nurturing spaces,
non-market spaces, that can ensure that more people have an opportunity to express
their humanity in the twenty-first century.
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Notes
1. Baker and de Sa, 2010, p. 287.
2. McChesney, 2013, p. 112.
3. The Universal Service Fund is paid for by contributions from providers of
telecommunications based on an assessment of their interstate and international enduser revenues. Examples of entities that contribute to the Fund are
telecommunications carriers, including wireline and wireless companies, and
interconnected Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) providers, including cable
companies that provide voice service.
4. For a firsthand account of how copyright law is used to stifle creative production,
see Cornblatt (2011).
5. The order was defined by three broad rules meant to establish network neutrality as
the normal state of affairs. (1) Transparency — Broadband providers must disclose
information regarding their network management practices, performance, and the
commercial terms of their broadband services; (2) No Blocking — Fixed broadband
providers (such as DSL, cable modem, or fixed wireless providers) may not block
lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices. Mobile broadband
providers may not block lawful Web sites or applications that compete with their

voice or video telephony services; (3) No Unreasonable Discrimination — Fixed
broadband providers may not unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful
network traffic over a consumer’s broadband Internet access service.
6. Starr, 2016, p. 107.
7. https://www.facebook.com/onlinecivilcourage/.
8. Hindman, 2009, p. 128.
9. Olmstead, et al., 2014, n.p.
10. Donner, 2015, p. 64.
11. Van Dijck, 2013, pp. 156–157.
12. Banks and Humphrey, 2008, p. 416.
13. Jarrett, 2015, p. 102.
14. Fuchs, 2008, p. 212.
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